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ABSTRACT Representation and democracy are not always complementary. Sometimes
the one undermines the other. Too much democracy can create a representation deficit,
as occurs when majorities oppress or neglect minorities. However, the opposite can
also arise. The over representation of different groups can undermine the processes
whereby representatives are authorised by and accountable to those they are supposed
to serve. The EU offers multiple channels of representation. In some respects, this
multiplicity reflects the diversity of the peoples, individuals and interests represented
within the EU. Yet in overcoming a potential representation deficit in EU policy-
making, this arrangement leads to a representation surplus and creates a democratic
deficit.
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The European Union (EU) has been diagnosed as suffering from a demo-
cratic deficit ever since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Opinions
abound as to the origins and severity of this malaise. Some commentators
have ascribed this deficit to a failure to institutionalise representative
democracy fully at the EU level by rendering the competences of the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP) analogous to those of national parliaments (NPs)
(Lodge 1994); others have identified the deficit in the lack of a European
demos, which depending on their perspective either could or could not be
overcome (Weiler 1995); while still others have located the deficit at the
domestic level and bemoaned the incursions of the integration process on
the powers of national representative institutions (Neunreither 1994). This
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introduction adds to this debate by arguing that much of this discussion
reflects and interacts with a more specific concern with what we shall call
the EU’s representation deficits, of which the democratic deficit is both a
cause and a symptom. As we shall see, democracy and representation do
not easily coexist and indeed can work to the detriment of each other.
Although most contemporary democracies describe themselves as
representative democracies, as does the EU in the Lisbon Treaty, the
conceptual and empirical compatibility of these two terms is far from self-
evident (Bobbio 1987). Historically, thinkers such as Jean-Jacques
Rousseau considered representation as intrinsically elitist because it
displaces the direct involvement of citizens in collective decision-making
(Rousseau 1968, 141). From this perspective, representation creates a
democratic deficit by its very nature. The eventual linkage of representa-
tion with democracy was a product of contingent developments, most
notably the gradual emergence of territorially confined nation states and
competitive party systems (Hobson 2008; Rokkan 1974). The French and
American Revolutions offered the intellectual and political context in
which democratic government came to be envisioned and institutionalised
as representative government (Urbinati 2004). What we today call the
standard model of representative democracy materialised from these cir-
cumstances. According to this model, the democratic credentials of repre-
sentatives could be assured by having credible electoral mechanisms for
their authorisation and accountability. So conceived, representative democ-
racy was viewed not simply as a second best adaption of direct democracy
to the size and complexity of modern polities, but also a superior form of
democracy whereby popular sovereignty was linked to the benefits of
expertise associated with a division of labour between rulers and ruled
that allowed for the professionalisation of politicians.
Nevertheless, doubts have arisen about the effectiveness of this linkage
from the beginning. On the one hand, the electoral mechanism has been
criticised for offering inadequate control over representatives. They have
been regarded as forming a class apart, concerned solely with the pursuit
of power or the perquisites of office (Mair 2006), and susceptible to cap-
ture by special interests with disproportionate influence or lobbying
power, such as the financial sector, with whom they often have close per-
sonal links (Parry 1969). This first kind of representation deficit we term
the elitist deficit. It arises when popular views are under-represented
because elites either only represent their own interests or those of small
but influential groups, such as bankers. On the other hand, the electoral
mechanism has been attacked for exercising too much control over repre-
sentatives. They become encouraged to strike populist attitudes that pan-
der to popular prejudices and become reluctant to sacrifice short term
gains for long term advantages (Brittan 1975). This second kind of repre-
sentation deficit we term the populist deficit. It arises when unpopular
views – of minorities or of expertise – are under-represented.
In different ways, which we explore below, both shortcomings can be
regarded as involving a failure of representatives to represent the interests
of the political community as a whole, thereby producing a representation
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deficit. Yet, in the first case it derives from a democratic deficit, in which
majority opinion fails to get adequately represented, in the second from
what could be called a democratic surplus, in which majority opinion is
overly represented. The traditional solutions have been to supplement or
constrain the electoral process respectively in ways that depart from the
standard model for the democratic authorisation and accountability of
representatives. However, as we shall see, each of these solutions threatens
the balance between representation and democracy found in the standard
model, and in addressing their respective problems risks introducing those
associated with the other representation deficit.
Views differ as to how far the EU itself manifests these problems (e.g.
Lord 2008; Moravcsik 2008), and the degree to which the integration pro-
cess is their source (Scharpf 2009) or their solution (Keohane, Macedo
and Moravcsik 2009) within the member states (MS). Criticisms of the
operation of the standard model of representative democracy have been
even harsher with regard to the EU than they are in the case of the MS
(Follesdal and Hix 2006). The predominance of domestic issues and par-
ties in European elections, the EU’s multilevel nature, the fact that legisla-
tive proposals come from the Commission and are subject to co-decision
by the Council of Ministers and the EP, among other features, have all
resulted in voters often finding it difficult to know what European policies
an individual politician or party stands for, let alone to identify which
decisions, if any, they can be held responsible for. As a result, a potential
representation deficit of the first, elitist, kind has seemed especially com-
pelling given the wide authority enjoyed by national executives and the
remote, complex and hard to follow decision-making processes of the EU.
One solution would be to move the EU towards the standard model by
electing a European government via direct elections to the EP, thereby
abolishing the European Council and the Commission in its current form.
However, though long advocated by dedicated European Federalists, only
a few regard it as likely in the short term (Duff 2012; Habermas 2012),
and many doubt its likelihood, workability or desirability in the long term
(Mair and Thomassen 2010b).
Therefore, while the standard model within the EU has been strength-
ened as the EP has progressively gained more powers, attention among aca-
demics and EU policy-makers has turned increasingly to alternative
channels and forms of representation that might overcome the distinctive
representation deficits of the Council, the Commission and the EP (Kro¨ger
and Friedrich 2013a; Mair and Thomassen 2010a). Three have proved par-
ticularly important, addressing each of these bodies respectively. First, NPs
have been formally recognised in the Lisbon Treaty as having a role within
the representative structure of EU decision-making and have been given
new powers to police the integration process. In this channel, the aim has
been to strengthen the standard model of representative democracy with
regard to one of its historical weaknesses – the discretion of executives with
regard to foreign, and specifically EU, affairs. As a result, parliaments have
become more proactive in ensuring their governments accurately represent
the views of parliaments and citizens when negotiating in Brussels. Second,
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the Commission has increasingly defended its legitimacy on the grounds
that it is precisely the comparative isolation of the EU’s decision-making
from democratic pressures that helps it overcome a representation deficit of
the second, populist, kind by offering a model of expert, efficient, and equi-
table good governance. Yet, to demonstrate its continued representative-
ness of the public as a whole it has increasingly consulted with civil society
organisations (CSOs) which have a particular interest in the policies that
fall within the EU’s competence. Though rarely authorised or accountable
in the standard sense, CSOs have been seen as offering a more participa-
tory way of gauging the views of citizens on a given issue and even for
mobilising a transnational or pan-European constituency around it. Finally,
the EU has begun to experiment with more direct forms of citizen involve-
ment, such as the citizens’ initiatives and referenda, that address a represen-
tation deficit of the first, elitist, kind through bypassing the use of
representatives altogether and allowing citizens to represent themselves.
This special issue explores examples of all three of these innovations.
While some regard them as a second best to the development of the stan-
dard model of representative democracy at the EU level, and even as fur-
ther intensifying the democratic deficit by muddying the lines of
authorisation and accountability (Bellamy 2010; Kro¨ger and Friedrich
2013b), others view them as part of a further transformation of democ-
racy (Dahl 1989, ch. 6; Bohman 2007). They mirror the use of similar
stratagems within the MS to overcome the two representation deficits pro-
duced by the standard model by various forms of direct democracy, on
the one hand, and non-majoritarian regulators, courts and independent
central banks, on the other. They claim these developments may have
weakened the influence of the electoral process upon the choice of EU rep-
resentatives, as per the standard model, but they have done so in ways
that have enhanced the representativeness of the system as a whole (Mora-
vcsik 2008). Indeed, they regard the EU’s multiple and complex channels
of representation as improving the representativeness of not only the EU
but also the MS. They help overcome the capture of national governments
by powerful domestic groups, enhance the avenues for representation and
the resources of expertise available to excluded minorities, and give a
voice to the citizens of other countries affected by the domestic decisions
of a MS other than their own who would otherwise have no way of influ-
encing them at all (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009). In other
words, the apparent democratic deficit of the EU is simply a function of
its tackling the representation deficits within both the EU and the MS.
As a preliminary to examining the different views sketched above, we
shall describe further the two representation deficits below, along with
their relationship to persisting tensions between representation and democ-
racy. We shall then apply this perspective to the analysis of the EU’s system
of representation. As we shall see, the EU provides numerous and poten-
tially conflicting channels of representation, some of which seek to address
a democratic deficit and others a democratic surplus – potential or actual –
while attempting to enhance the representative nature of the system as a
whole. This evaluation – like that of the articles in this special issue – is
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necessarily normative as well as empirical, since the various standards of
democracy and representation employed reflect normative criteria. Our
claim will be that there is often a trade-off between the representativeness
of a political system and its democratic responsiveness, and that to some
degree the EU is moving towards a representation surplus that needs
rebalancing in the direction of democracy.
The Two Representation Deficits of Representative Democracy
As we noted, the tension between representation and democracy has been
overcome in standard models of representative democracy via an electoral
process for authorising representatives and holding them to account. This
process has rested in its turn on certain assumptions about political equal-
ity and the nature of the demos. To respect democratic norms, a system of
representation needs to offer a form of government that citizens can per-
ceive to be both ‘of’ and ‘for’ the people. The process whereby representa-
tives are chosen must be such that citizens can see their interests and
views are treated with equal concern and respect, and the decisions their
representatives make must promote policies that taken overall can be
defended as promoting the equal advancement of those views and interests
(Dahl 1989, ch. 3; Christiano 2008). Therefore, as Article 9 of the Lisbon
Treaty recognises, political equality provides the meta-norm of representa-
tive democracy (Lord and Pollak 2010, 126).
Both ontological and epistemological conditions concerning the nature
of the demos ground this emphasis on political equality. Ontologically, the
basis for giving everyone an equal say in the collective decision-making
process stems from the assumption that all have a roughly equal stake in
those decisions, at least as a package if not in each and every one (Christi-
ano 2008, 78–88). Epistemologically, this criterion assumes that each citi-
zen is the best judge of his or her own interests, if not necessarily of how
they might be best met then of those potential representatives most likely
to find ways to meet them and of their success or failure in doing so
(Christiano 2008, 88–100). If both conditions regarding the demos hold,
the decision-makers and decisions preferred by the majority of the people
on the basis of an equal vote will be those most likely to promote their
collective interest (Dahl 1989, chs. 8 and 10; Christiano 2008, ch. 6).
A representation deficit arises when either the process fails to offer voters
a choice of representatives that reflects equal concern and respect for their
various views and interests, or their representatives fail to promote policies
that advance them on an equal basis. That may occur due to a lack of
responsiveness in the system for selecting representatives, or because either
the ontological or the epistemological conditions do not apply. Lack of
responsiveness usually involves the tyranny of the minority resulting from
the capture of the system by a particularly influential group – either
directly, through their presence within the political class, or indirectly,
through their power over it. It corresponds to the first, elitist, kind of repre-
sentative deficit noted above. This deficit is invoked when critics complain
- rightly or wrongly – that democratic politicians of all parties form an elite
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that serves its own interests and those of other members of the elite rather
than the people more generally (Parry 1969). By contrast, the absence of
the ontological and epistemological conditions is most associated with the
tyranny of the majority and populism, and the consequent neglect of either
intense or discrete minorities, or the pursuit of short-term benefits that
prove costly in the long-term. Thus, the second, populist, kind of represen-
tation deficit has two forms. Representation deficit of type 2A results from
the absence of the ontological condition. It occurs when citizens have
unequal stakes or apply quite different criteria to assessing policies that
reflect cultural differences. In such circumstances, the risk that populist
majorities may exert majority tyranny over consistent minorities is greatly
increased. This concern is often voiced by minority national groups in mul-
tinational systems, such as the French Canadians in Quebec or the Scots in
the UK. Representation deficit of type 2B results from the absence of the
epistemological condition. It occurs when myopia or misinformation or
some other cognitive failing means that citizens may press representatives
to act against the general long term interest, or be susceptible to their doing
so for electoral advantage. A standard example is the temptation for gov-
ernments to buy voters through a mix of tax cuts and public spending
increases that ultimately proves unsustainable (Brittan 1975).
As we observed above, neither of these problems is new, with radical
and liberal critics of representative democracy addressing the first and sec-
ond of these representation deficits respectively from the eighteenth cen-
tury onwards. By and large, their solutions have involved proposals that
seek to enhance the representativeness of the system via alternatives to the
democratic processes of authorisation and accountability favoured by the
standard model of representative democracy. For example, solutions to the
first, elite, deficit have involved introducing forms of direct democracy –
from citizens’ juries to referenda. Here the cause of the representation defi-
cit results from the mechanisms of democratic control being insufficient to
ensure representatives reflect the views and concerns of the people as
opposed to a small section of it or themselves. In the terminology of repre-
sentation theory, they are insufficiently descriptively representative to
stand and act ‘as’ those they represent. Given this failing results from a
deficit in the electoral process, the natural solution is to improve the possi-
bility for citizens to represent themselves directly. By contrast, solutions to
the second, populist, deficits of discrete minorities (2A) and myopic, misin-
formed or self-interested majorities (2B) have involved respectively giving
extra weight to minority views by giving them special representation
rights, such as extra seats or a guaranteed representation in the executive,
(2A) and the removal of certain decisions from democratic control to be
decided by non-elected representatives of the public interest, such as courts
or experts consulting with relevant groups (2B). In these cases, improving
the representativeness of the system involves addressing the relevant onto-
logical and epistemological problems in the composition of the demos by
constraining the democratic process in various ways so as to give more
than an equal voice to otherwise neglected minority or independent views.
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Such moves seek to strengthen the capacity of representatives to stand and
act ‘for’ the best interests of the community as a whole.
Worryingly, dealing with the first deficit may exacerbate the second and
vice versa. Enhancing direct democracy to overcome the elitism involved
in the first kind of representation deficit may give rise to the very populism
and prejudice associated with the second kind of representation deficit.
Yet, constraining the democratic process and enhancing the authority of
representatives risks in its turn the elitism of the first kind of representa-
tive deficit in which representatives ignore the interests and views of voters
when they should take them into account. Meanwhile, the more the stan-
dard model of representative democracy is supplemented or constrained
by these two sorts of measures the harder it will be to either authorise rep-
resentatives or hold them to account. Decisions will emerge from complex,
often non-transparent, processes as the product of many hands and differ-
ent groups of people. The result may be a system that is highly representa-
tive in many ways but not particularly democratic in the sense of
operating under the equal public control of the people.
The more diverse and complex a society, and the greater its openness to
other societies, the more likely these two deficits will occur. A demos
assumes a people bound by cooperative relations of mutual advantage that
are conducive to political equality (Miller 2009). In these circumstances,
the ontological and epistemological conditions for democratic decision-
making will apply. Though the cross-cutting cleavages of pluralist societies
can foster these conditions, the more segmented and differentiated socie-
ties become the less that will be the case (Dahl 1989, ch. 5). Interests and
the criteria for evaluating them will diverge in ways that prove not only
conflicting but incommensurable as well. As a result, pressures will grow
to devolve democratic decision-making downwards and often directly to
distinct groups to overcome the first, elitist, representation deficit, and to
make those decisions that need to be made collectively by a mix of con-
sensual means, in which all groups have an equal say regardless of size,
and unelected neutral third parties chosen on the basis of supposedly
objective criteria, to address each of the second, populist, representation
deficits. Most of the MS have experienced these difficulties and attempted
some combination of the remedies noted above to address them – though
some, such as Belgium and increasingly the UK, more than others, such as
France.
That a political entity as large and diverse as the EU should have been
characterised as suffering from both kinds of representation deficit is
unsurprising, therefore. On the one hand, it has been viewed as precipitat-
ing the elitist kind of deficit. National executives and members of the EP
(MEPs) have been charged with a failure to respond to citizens’ views,
with the Commission – according to such critics – at best an unaccount-
able bureaucracy concerned to maximise its own power, at worst captured
by business and other sinister interests. On the other hand, it has also been
regarded as prone to the two populist deficits. Particularly during the Euro
crisis, EU decisions have been attacked for reflecting the views of the lar-
ger, wealthier states and paying insufficient attention to the social, eco-
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nomic and cultural diversity of the MS (deficit 2A), or being too abstruse
and technical to be responsibly tackled by elected politicians who must
pander to the partial and self-interested concerns of domestic electorates
(deficit 2B). Consequently, to an even greater extent than in the MS, the
EU has evolved a particularly complex system of representation that
supplements an incomplete and partial institutionalisation of the standard
model of representation within the EP, with numerous other channels and
forms of representation. These range from the strengthening of NPs and
the introduction of citizen initiatives and referenda, that seek to overcome
the first elitist deficit, to the use of consensus or highly qualified majority
decision making in the Council and supermajorities in the EP to tackle the
2A version of the second populist deficit, and the Commission’s wide-
spread use of non-majoritarian bodies and consultation with CSOs to
address the 2B version.
Some regard this complex system as diminishing the prospect offered by
the standard model of knowing what actor is responsible for making
which decision and holding them to account for it, both within the MS
and the EU. You cannot ‘throw the scoundrels out’ (Weiler 2012, 829). It
becomes harder to judge how representative decisions are – to what degree
they do reflect and favour political equality. Another perspective believes
either the EU meets – or could meet – the ontological and epistemological
conditions of a demos (Hix 2008; Habermas 2012). By contrast, others
believe the standard model is inappropriate and unnecessary within the
EU. They regard the complexity as an essential new development to meet
circumstances where there is no single demos but rather multiple demoi –
both national and transnational. Their representation can only be guaran-
teed through multiple channels of representation that do not employ the
formal democratic processes of the standard model (Weiler, Haltern and
Meyer 1995; Moravcsik 2008; Fabbrini 2010). It is to the description and
evaluation of the EU’s system of representation that we now turn, noting
along the way the contribution of the various articles in this special issue
to this debate.
The EU’s System of Representation
Representation is a central concept in the way in which the EU under-
stands its democratic legitimacy. Title II on ‘Provisions on Democratic
Principles’ of the Lisbon Treaty highlights two key principles: ‘political
equality’, in Article 9, and ‘representative democracy’, in Article 10. These
provide the self-proclaimed democratic ‘meta-standards’ of the EU (Lord
and Pollak 2010, 126). As Article 10 spells out:
(2) Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Par-
liament. Member States are represented in the European Council by
their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their gov-
ernments, themselves democratically accountable either to their
national Parliaments, or to their citizens.
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(3) Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life
of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as
possible to the citizen.
(4) Political parties at European level contribute to forming European
political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the
Union.
In addition, Article 11 stipulates that the European institutions shall give
citizens and associations ‘the opportunity to make known and publicly
exchange their views in all areas of Union action’ and to maintain a regular
and open dialogue with them. It also introduces the European Citizen Ini-
tiative whereby a group of at least a million EU citizens may petition the
European Commission to further actions that fall within its competences.
Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty distinguishes between an electoral, a terri-
torial, a functional, and a direct channel of representation. However, it
does not clarify the relationship between them. Moreover, political equal-
ity in the Lisbon Treaty refers to two different political subjects: individu-
als and states (Kro¨ger and Friedrich 2013b). These two kinds of subjects
involve different normative goals and a related distribution of rights and
obligations. On the one hand, there are national representative democra-
cies that rest on the political equality of individuals and the EP that seeks,
however imperfectly, to transfer this representation of individuals to the
EU level. In these cases, political equality refers to the individual’s equal
right to elect, control and sanction government. On the other hand, states
are also the subject of political equality and thus of democratic representa-
tion, and it is states which bear certain rights and obligations. In this case,
democratic rule is in the hands of elected governments. Both kinds of sub-
jectivity have different reference points: popular sovereignty, in the first,
and state sovereignty, in the second.The former points towards an inte-
grated European polity with state-like characteristics, while the latter
treats the EU as an advanced intergovernmental organisation. The one is
primarily enacted through electoral, functional and potentially direct
representation, whereas the other is primarily enacted through territorial
representation.
This institutional complexity of different channels of representation –
and we have not even mentioned the comitology system and all the pow-
ers delegated to more or less independent agencies – and as mirrored in
the seat and vote distribution in both the EP and the Councils, is precisely
an attempt to come to terms with the EU’s potential representation defi-
cits. NPs and the EP and the direct democratic channels such as referenda
seek to address the first representation deficit by controlling the actions of
elites, especially national executives and the Commission. As we noted
above, the use of degressive proportionality to allocate seats in the EP and
the double majority required for voting in the Council (55 per cent of
states representing 65 per cent of the EU population) is designed to ensure
that proposals have the backing of small and large states, while the ordin-
ary legislative procedure involving co-decision with the EP effectively
means that they also are backed by a broad ideological consensus. As such
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it overcomes the first version of the second kind of representative deficit
(2A) whereby minorities might be overlooked by tyrannous majorities.
However, the relative independence of the Commission and the aforemen-
tioned use of non-majoritarian regulators and consultation with sectoral
groups and CSOs are designed to overcome the second version of this defi-
cit (2B) by ensuring the representation of experts and the general interest
in policy-making. The result is a multitude of avenues for representation.
Yet, this very abundance arguably creates a representation surplus in many
instances, with increasing difficulties for holding the representatives to
account.
From Demos to Demoicracy?
One recent attempt to justify this representation surplus and come to
terms with the apparently insurmountable divide between a stress on the
political equality of states, on the one hand, and the political equality
of citizens, on the other, has been to think of the EU as a demoicracy
(Nikolaı¨dis 2004). This view stresses ‘the horizontal and mutual opening
between peoples in a shared polity. It assumes that Europe is not consti-
tuted by separate demoi nor demoi-made-into-one demos but by distinct
political demoi progressively opening to each other and to each other’s
democratic systems’ (Nikolaı¨dis 2013, 252). It argues that national repre-
sentative democracy should remain at the centre of European democracy,
but also sees the EU as a way of perfecting rather than dissolving national
democracies. It argues in favour of some degree of supranationality and
the respective loss of national sovereignty, but also holds that there should
be a ‘right to exit’, which federalists ‘decry’, thereby presenting European
integration as an open-ended process. In sum, in a demoicracy peoples
‘govern together but not as one’ (Nikolaı¨dis 2013, 254).
As the demoicratic approach indicates, the question of whether or not
citizens or peoples are democratically represented in the EU rests on a sat-
isfactory resolution of the constituency question, namely the question of
which body politique should be represented, at which level, and of
whether that political community accepts the respective representation as
legitimate. If in a globalised world a return to a world of independent sov-
ereign nation-states seems foreclosed, a system of interdependent nation
states offers in many respects an appealing vision of the EU. As Richard
Bellamy suggests in his contribution to this issue, paradoxical though it
may seem supranational integration and cooperation are necessary for
nation-states to retain some sovereignty over their territorial affairs and
interests. Bellamy proposes that ‘EU institutions are best conceived as rep-
resenting the peoples of Europe’. He shows why democratic legitimacy
involves governments being representative of a people and outlines the
ontological and epistemological conditions that must hold both domesti-
cally and in the supranational environment of the EU in order to establish
conditions of civic freedom through collective self-government. Bellamy
argues that the EU’s system of representation actually facilitates the repre-
sentation of different European demoi, and suggests that ‘moves away
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from such a union towards greater political unity involve an inevitable loss
of representativeness and democratic legitimacy’. From this perspective,
the key is to represent citizens in decisions that relate to the ways their
political communities interact and interconnect in a manner that shows
both citizens and states equal concern and respect. Yet, that solution rests
on the EU’s competences remaining limited to those issues that facilitate
but do not subvert their interdependence.
In their contribution, Christopher Lord and Johannes Pollak offer an
alternative account of the representative system of the EU. They argue that
it is best understood and evaluated not through the lens of the standard
account but via the claims-making approach developed by Michael
Saward (2006, 2010). Saward argues that representation can be under-
stood as a constantly changing social dialogue in which different actors
make claims to audiences which discuss, reject or amend them. His work
is grounded on three assumptions. First, representation is not a relation-
ship at precise moments such as elections, but must be thought of as a
continuing process that evolves over time. Second, the core of representa-
tion is the practice of claims-making to be a representative. Third, constit-
uents and representatives need not be respectively members of electoral
districts or elected parliamentarians. Saward insists on the dynamic nature
of the relationship and on the performative (rather than the institutional)
side of representation, in which both represented and representative play
active roles. Such a conception of representation, according to Saward, is
well suited to capture power and interests in political representation.
Lord and Pollak argue that the claims-making approach remains theo-
retically underspecified. They propose a revised version in which claims
about rights and obligations are used to specify representative claims, so
that it is clear who represents whom and for what purposes. In applying
this revised version to the EU, they argue that the representative system
outlined above can be seen as a series of claims by the EP, Council, and
NPs, among other actors, to represent citizens within the EU arena in
which distinctive rights and obligations are attributed to different actors.
As such, it offers an alternative sort of representative system to one con-
ceived according to the standard model. Yet, as they concede, worries
about authorisation and accountability remain even in their revised model.
The Role of National Parliaments
The traditional mechanism for tackling this issue has been through the
parliamentarisation of the EU by strengthening the EP and the European
parties and thereby enhancing the link between citizens and their respec-
tive MEPs and rendering European elections first-order elections (Follesdal
and Hix 2006). Proponents of this position also often suggest the election
of the President of the European Commission by the EP (Decker 2002,
261; Hix 2002). They attribute the greatest hindrances to the development
of European democracy to the lack of a European-wide party system capa-
ble of generating government and opposition groups within the EP (Hix
and Follesdal 2006). They contend that by increasing political competition
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at the EU level by empowering the EP, voters will become more aware of
what their MEPs are doing and so be more interested in having a say
come the next elections. As a result, the democratic deficit would dissolve.
However, many dispute this analysis. They note that the continuous
transfer of competences to the EP has been accompanied by a steady
decline in voter turn out (Weiler 2012, 830). They also contend that the
standard model would be inappropriate at the EU level because it would
produce a representation deficit of minority peoples that the current system
serves to protect (Dehousse 1995). Indeed, the current system works well
at representing left-right opinion across the EU not despite the second-
order nature of European elections but because of that nature (Mair and
Thomassen 2010b). Yet, in avoiding a populist representation deficit of
type 2A it creates one of the first elitist kind because it makes it hard to
hold representatives to account and to actually influence policy decisions
(Me´ny 2002, 9).
Either in reaction to the prevailing difficulties with democratisation via
the EP, or because of different concerns to start with: namely, the poten-
tially damaging effects of European integration on domestic democratic
politics and on NPs in particular, increasing attention has been paid to
NPs and to strengthening their role in EU policy-making. In the EU con-
text, the domestically rather clear role-distribution between government
and parliament gets blurred. Neither the parliament nor the government
has direct influence over the European agenda. Governments hardly ever
have electoral authorisation for specific Union policies nor can they or
NPs initiate legislation. Meanwhile, the powers of accountability of the
opposition as well as of parliament more generally are weakened (see
Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra in this volume; Bellamy and Kro¨ger
2012). Not surprisingly then, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of a
‘deparliamentarisation’ thesis (Raunio and Hix 2000). This thesis seeks to
capture the transfer of policy-making powers to the EU and the commen-
surate strengthening of executives in EU policy-making. The resulting deci-
sional and informational asymmetries between the legislature and the
executive produce a loss of power and influence of domestic parliaments –
and with them those of the electorate who elect them (Auel and Benz
2005, 373; Raunio and Hix 2000, 145). NPs have no direct control over
European policy-making and ‘suffer from a lack of authoritative power
over transnational policymaking’ (Schmidt 1999, 25). Instead, executives
have become the ‘gatekeepers’ in EU policy-making with NPs the main
‘losers’ of European integration (Maurer and Wessels 2001; Bellamy and
Kro¨ger 2012).
Against this trend, NPs have become actors in their own right in EU pol-
icy-making. The Lisbon Treaty mentions NPs in the main text of the Treaty
for the first time. Article 12 details the basic rights and functions of NPs in
EU matters and introduces an ‘Early Warning Mechanism’ (EWM) that
assigns national legislatures the right to scrutinise proposed EU decisions
and initiatives for compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and pro-
portionality. Furthermore, NPs can have a collective legislative influence in
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that a majority of them may force, by way of a so-called ‘orange card’, an
early vote on an EU legislative proposal in the Council and the EP.
In his contribution to this issue, Ian Cooper argues that this develop-
ment suggests a ‘tricameral’ model in which ‘NPs constitute the third
chamber in the EU’s representative system’. Cooper defends this kind of
reconfiguration of representation and argues that it ‘moves the EU away
from traditional models of representative democracy and more towards a
complex “demoi-cracy”’. However, as Carina Sprungk notes in her contri-
bution, the role of NPs is changing in the process. Her main contention is
that ‘rather than simply re-enhancing traditional powers of NPs, these
reforms imply ideas of a new type of parliamentary democracy in Europe’,
leading to a ‘sustainable transformation of national democracy’. More spe-
cifically, Sprungk shows that under the Lisbon Treaty, and as a reaction
to being the ‘main losers’ of European integration, NPs need to adapt new
roles in order to fight their own disempowerment, which however ‘signifi-
cantly deviate from or even conflict with their traditional roles’. These
new roles, which the empirical analysis explores in the French, German
and Polish parliaments, are gatekeepers, networkers, and unitary scrutiniz-
ers, all of which require NPs to become more cooperative actors while
neglecting their traditional representing and controlling functions, findings
that are echoed in the analysis by Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra.
Indeed, Sonja Puntscher Riekmann’s and Doris Wydra’s contribution
suggests an even more pessimistic analysis. They note the difficult balance
within the EU between the representation of citizens and that of demoi,
or, as they put it the ‘representation of the whole versus the representation
of the parts’. As they show, in EU policy-making achieving this balance is
particularly difficult for parliaments that are asked to ‘endorse the Euro-
pean decisions of their governments and simultaneously to sell the sacri-
fices to their constituencies’ given that the preferences of governments
resulting from international obligations and those of domestic constituen-
cies can be quite different. The empirical evidence presented shows that
from 2010–2012 in Italy, Germany, and Austria legislation relating to the
handling of the Euro-crisis was passed in NPs by majorities that were time
and again formed by government and opposition parties. This suggests
that many MPs entrapped in the European rescue discourse preferred to
represent ‘the whole’ rather than its ‘part’, privileging the supposed Euro-
pean demos over their own constituency. That could be regarded as a
responsible response to the crisis that avoids a populist representation defi-
cit of type 2B. Yet, it potentially involves representation deficits of the first
elitist kind and possibly of type 2A as well (Mair 2006). It suggests that
opposition parties in particular have neither controlled the ‘part’ that their
national government represents nor ‘the whole’ that the Council repre-
sents, allowing an elite solution to be imposed without popular support.
That proves an especially deleterious desertion of their duty to oppose
given the bailout and austerity packages have been largely set outside the
normal EU decision-making process, thereby allowing the more powerful
credit states to set terms for the weaker and smaller debtor states – the
resort to an extra-Union Treaty being ‘but the poignant legal manifesta-
Representation Deficits and Surpluses in EU Policy-making 489
tion of this political reality’ (Weiler 2012, 831). As a result, Puntscher
Riekmann and Wydra contend that the demoicratic approach of Bellamy
fails, and that there may be no alternative to strengthening the standard
model of representation within the EP and creating a European demos.
The Role of Non-State Actors
Disillusionment with parliamentary institutions, both the EP and the NPs,
has led some to question the continued viability of the standard model of
representation that they embody altogether. They note that while the tra-
ditional institutions of representative democracies are facing falling voter
turnout, a massive drop in party membership and declining overall trust,
other forms of political action coming from civil society, both unorganised
and organised, have firmly established themselves in the political arena.
They contend that the modern territorial state, and with it the link
between democracy and representation, is challenged through a variety of
diversification processes, including those of supranational (European)
integration, of competences, actors, and arenas, which have contributed to
the increasing dilution of traditional representative politics (Warren and
Castiglione 2004). Given the transfer of competences to the EU, its frag-
mentation and its densely structured multi-level politics, all of which
weaken the ability of national democracies to keep decision-making
authority in their hands, the relationship between representation, democ-
racy and the nation-state in the EU is particularly strained. What is more,
the nation-state’s apparently clear demarcation of the demos that can or
should be represented is increasingly dissolving and there is no clear insti-
tutional centre of authority anymore given the delegation of competences
to a multitude of non-state or semi-state actors. In the light of these devel-
opments, it has subsequently been argued that representation can no
longer be restricted to electoral representation or to representation in the
nation-state (Rehfeld 2006; Lord and Pollak 2010).
Indeed, there has been a systematic attempt by the European Commis-
sion to promote and develop ‘societal representation’ at the EU level and
include non-state actors, and in particular CSOs, in EU politics (Bellamy
and Castiglione 2010; Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007; Saurugger 2010). In
the much debated White Paper on Governance (2001), the Commission
even went so far as to claim ‘its legitimacy today depends on involvement
and participation’ (European Commission 2001, 11). Since the early
1990s, it has massively invested in the creation and survival of some large,
non-profit seeking European umbrella organizations, thereby seeking to
increase the legitimacy of its proposals and to contribute to the construc-
tion of a transnational demos. The EU more generally has also accorded
CSOs an important role in its policy-making, culminating in the Lisbon
Treaty which establishes a legal duty to consult with them.
Many scholars of the role of CSOs in the EU have been interested in
whether – or indeed hoped that – CSOs could act as a means of bridging
the gap between EU citizens and Brussels, a functional equivalent to (the
lack of) parties at the EU level, a force of Europeanisation and democrati-
490 Richard Bellamy & Sandra Kro¨ger
sation at the same time, constructing a European demos and thereby ren-
dering the EU more legitimate overall. The hope is that CSOs and their
interactions and input into policy-making could provide the mutual trust
that is needed under circumstances of mutual (inter-)dependence as we
find them in the EU as well as for more legitimate governance of the EU
itself as it expands its competences. As is well known, the EU lacks the
fundamental features of nation-states which enable citizens to collectively
govern themselves: a demos, a public sphere for debate, and therefore an
authoritative channel of representation. Seeking to enforce further political
integration in the EU without the necessary democratic substructure may
indeed be dangerous both for the EU and the national democracies that
compose it (Schmitter 2000, 115), and CSOs are imagined to bridge that
gap. More normatively, some authors argue that party politics is in some
structural sense exclusive and that therefore additional forms of represen-
tation are required (Mansbridge 1999; Young 2000). From this perspec-
tive, functional representation, according to some authors, could
contribute to the realisation of political equality if it brings weak interests
into the political process (Young 2000).
Two contributions to this issue address related questions empirically.
Sandra Kro¨ger explores whether European umbrellas of CSOs are actually
representative of the constituencies they claim to represent, arguing that
no matter whether these organisations represent professional interests, a
cause or weak interests, societal involvement in their representation is
required for it to be legitimate. Her findings show that umbrellas active in
the field of agricultural policy are highly representative of their constituen-
cies, while less representativeness is found for environmental groups and
still less for anti-poverty organisations. In the two latter cases, EU policy-
making seems to still be a matter of a few Europeanised policy officers,
who additionally often use other lobbying strategies than the investigated
European umbrellas. The related CSOs, therefore, do not seem to mediate
between the EU and its citizens as hoped by some normative theorists or
Commission officials – not via the investigated EU umbrellas anyway.
Instead, the involvement of the European umbrellas contributes to the cre-
ation of a representation surplus.
In her contribution, Elizabeth Monaghan looks at CSOs not so much as
interest aggregators, but as dynamic claims-makers who dispose of multi-
ple ways to make issues present (see the contribution by Lord and Pollak
to this issue). Addressing the role CSOs have played in the context of EU
climate change policy, she makes three points. First, CSOs are autono-
mous actors of representation which do not necessarily represent pre-exist-
ing constituencies and interests, but instead shape an issue and the
representation of that issue themselves. They represent an issue rather than
a people. Second, Monaghan notes ‘the independent role of ideas in shap-
ing actors’ behaviour alongside an assessment of which course of action
promotes their material benefit’. Third, in the context of EU democracy,
CSOs are associated with a normative project which is ‘about democracy
as building a political community’, the desirability of which as a top-down
project Monaghan questions.
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A More Direct Say for Citizens
The last channel of representation is the direct channel. This is the most
recent channel, which was introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon in the
form of the European Citizen’s Initiative (ECI) and only came into force
in April 2012. Its legal basis is set out in Article 11, para. 4 TEU and in
Article 24, para. 1 TFEU. By way of an ECI, European citizens can invite
the Commission to propose legislation on matters where the EU has com-
petence to legislate. The ECI has to be backed by at least one million EU
citizens, coming from at least seven out of the 28 MS. Once officially
registered, the organisers of the ECI have one year to collect signatures.
After that, the Commission examines the initiative and decides whether to
take action or not. If it decides to put forward a legislative proposal, the
normal legislative procedure is in place, and, if adopted, becomes law.
Another The ECI harks back to a tradition of directly involving citizens
that long pre-dates this innovation – namely, the use of referenda in
nation-states. The Commission and pro-Europeans more generally have
often been fearful of such exercises in direct democracy. Following the
‘petit oui’ of the French Maastricht referendum, and the rejection of the
Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands and, in the first ref-
erendum, of the Lisbon Treaty by Ireland, they have understandably wor-
ried that such moves favour those opposed to European integration. In
their study, Richard Rose and Gabriela Borz present evidence that chal-
lenges their assumption. Multi-level statistical analysis shows that citizens
dissatisfied with government performance are more likely to want referen-
dums to check their governors and that national context matters. How-
ever, they are in a minority. Most of those who endorse EU referendums
favour the EU as it is: what raises doubts are steps toward further integra-
tion. As a result, the risk of defeat if the EU consulted its citizens in a
pan-European referendum is less than might have been supposed. As such,
it offers a way of offering popular endorsement for the EU that may over-
come the first, elitist, representation deficit and some of the democratic
deficit. The present practice of regarding referendums as subsidiary choices
that are left to each MS to decide creates inequalities among EU citizens.
This has meant that from 72 to 99 per cent of citizens have had no chance
to vote on a treaty. A pan-European referendum would give all citizens a
chance to vote. The result would need a federal type decision rule for con-
stitutional amendment, for example, a super-majority of voters and of
MS, and provisions for national majorities opposed to further integration
to opt out rather than veto, as at present. Otherwise, this proposal would
run the risk of both forms of populist representation deficit in that if, as
they suggest, national preoccupations remain salient, then certain national
groups might override the views of other less populous nations and,
though they believe it less likely, there is also the danger of a rejection of
long term European for short-term national advantages. In other words,
even more than with the EP, a pan-European referendum requires that the
ontological and epistemological conditions for a demos are met.
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Conclusion: The Conflicts and Complementarities between Representation
and Democracy
European integration has brought about a transformation of political
authority by which the state loses its monopoly on collectively-binding
decision-making. The result is a transformation of national sovereignty
which is occurring empirically, and which scholars are struggling to come
to terms with conceptually. Since it took on its modern meaning, national
sovereignty provided an account of legitimate rule, within a confined terri-
tory and associated with defined functions, in which political authority
was ‘singular and supreme’ (Goodhart 2007, 573). What contemporary
scholars are struggling with, then, is to detach the notion of sovereignty –
and thereby representation – from boundaries that bind together territory,
demos and the idea of the rightful rule of that demos within those defined
boundaries, leading some to criticise what they call ‘methodological
nationalism’ (Zu¨rn 2000) which does not question the Westphalian state
as its point of departure when thinking of normative democratic standards
today.
Indeed, the EU is a problem for democratic theory insofar as it cannot
be democratic according to modern accounts of democracy. On the one
hand, why should we expect institutions and norms of democracy which
were developed for and in the national context to retain their meaning if
translated to a fundamentally different, supranational context? Given the
historical contingency of territorial boundaries and the decreasing congru-
ence between the people affected by political decisions and nation-state
boundaries, democratic theory is not well advised to treat the identity of a
people as given. On the other hand, it would be unacceptable to not be
guided by normative standards when evaluating the democratic quality of
the EU, and citizens are likely to be inspired in their assessment by what
they consider to be democratically legitimate in their respective national
contexts.
The problem is epitomised by the way representation and democracy
are coming apart within the EU. In the context of a sovereign state, where
representatives are responsible for the main policies affecting citizens and
these citizens form a people that meet the ontological and epistemological
conditions specified above, minimal tension need exist between democracy
and representation. Popular sovereignty can be exercised to authorise and
hold representatives to account without the danger of any of the represen-
tation deficits. Yet, as states become more interconnected, their popula-
tions more diverse, and decision-making more complex, the more likely
representation deficits become. To the extent the EU involves demoi rather
than a demos, the different peoples need to be represented to prevent any
becoming a consistent minority – the representation deficit identified above
as type 2B. That requirement may now apply to the 12 million EU citizens
who live in a MS other than that of their nationality – roughly 24 times
the populations of Luxembourg or Malta. Yet, that group, forming only
2 per cent of the EU population, does not itself constitute a European
demos. However, representing such diversity makes it hard to broker deci-
sions that are in the general interest. Veto players and joint decision traps
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abound. As a result, a deficit of type 2A may arise in which each people
seeks its own advantage at the expense of other peoples. For example, an
adequate solution to the Euro-crisis is hampered by the fact that national
politicians in both debtor and credit states have had to balance immediate
domestic electoral demands against the long term need for a fundamental
restructuring to render the Euro zone an optimal currency area. The diffi-
culties of doing so has led some to argue that the key problem in the EU
is not a democratic deficit but a democratic surplus provoking a ‘populist’
representation deficit, whereby local priorities and preferences prevent
governments from committing to the long term changes the future of the
euro requires (Moravcsik 2012, 66–7). Yet, the alternatives of a settlement
imposed from above by technocrats or the more powerful credit states
return us to a representative deficit of the elitist type, that has spawned
increasingly vocal forms of populist anti-Europeanism (Leconte 2010).
In this special issue we have explored a number of attempts to overcome
these problems and rebalance representation and democracy: through
empowering NPs, through enhancing consultation with non-state actors
and through the direct participation of citizens. They seek respectively to
revive the standard model of representation, offer a non-standard form of
representation and do away with representation altogether. Each was
found wanting in themselves. The NPs were thought to strengthen the stan-
dard model of representation with regard to national executives negotiating
in the Council, thereby tackling an aspect of the first, elitist, representation
deficit within the EU. Yet, not only was its effectiveness doubted, but also
a risk exists that it might strengthen the second, populist, representation
deficits. National politicians may be less inclined to make national sacri-
fices for the greater European good, thereby risking both the more power-
ful states overruling the weaker (type 2A) and producing suboptimal
policies as a result (type 2B). If this leads to a strengthening of technocracy
and elite rule, legitimacy might be obtained through consultation with
CSOs as representatives of an emerging transnational European civil soci-
ety. However, their representative nature was disputed, as was their Euro-
peanised character. As a result, employing this measure to address the
second, populist, deficits would appear, as predicted, to have reintroduced
the first, elitist, deficit. Finally, we explored direct democracy in the form
of referenda as a solution to this latter problem. While the concern that it
would in its turn promote one form of the second, populist, deficit (2B)
was shown to be less than feared, referenda can themselves be mechanisms
of elite manipulation given they are usually in charge of posing the ques-
tion. In the absence of a demos it may also still lead to a deficit of type 2A,
in which a majority tyrannises a minority.
The balance between representation and democracy in the EU proves
hard to achieve, therefore. Overcoming the democratic deficit risks pro-
ducing a representation deficit and vice versa. The challenge and direction
for future research must be to look at both the separate channels of repre-
sentation and the ways they interact. Only such a holistic approach is
likely to produce a view of the EU’s political system that can combine
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both representation and democracy in ways that are complementary rather
than conflicting.
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